Public good provision with a governor

We study a public good game with N citizens and a Governor who allocates resources from a common fund. Citizens may voluntarily contribute or be compelled to do so if audited, in which case shirkers face a penalty. The Governor decides how much of the fund to devote to public good provision, with the remainder embezzled. Crucially, the Governor’s utility combines material payoffs from embezzlement with belief-dependent reputational concerns. We characterize the symmetric subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) of the game. The model always admits at least one pure-strategy equilibrium, ranging from universal free-riding with complete embezzlement to full contribution with efficient provision. Symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria arise only within a limited region of the parameter space and may not be unique. Our analysis highlights the roles of penalties, audits, and reputational incentives in sustaining contribution and provision, thereby linking public good provision with the broader literature on corruption, embezzlement, and psychological game theory.